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Abstract 
The results of the first round 2014 presidential elections in Romania predicted a comfortable win 
for the incumbent Prime Minister Victor Ponta, the president of the Social Democratic Party. 
After the first round, Ponta held a 10% lead over the Christian-Liberal Alliance candidate Klaus 
Iohannis. The runoff campaign was marked by reports displayed on all TV channels showing the 
Romanian Diaspora not being able to vote abroad. Surprisingly, Klaus Iohannis, who obtained 
54% of the votes, won the second round of elections. Iohannis obtained 89% of Diaspora’s votes, 
adding a 4% gain in front of his contender. In most studies on electoral behavior, the focus for 
explaining why people go to vote is centered at the level of the “country, election, electoral 
cohort or individual voter” (Franklin 2004). Notably absent from these studies is the impact 
Diaspora on the election results and the predictors of turnout. The impact on national elections of 
this category of citizens is not to be neglected and it becomes important especially in 
democratizing states. In this vein we focus on the predictors that lie behind the political 
participation and preferences of Romanian Diaspora. We will test two basic models that explain 
participation (Franklin 2004). First there is research that focuses on the social determinants of 
voting (Verba and Nie 1972) labeled as “the baseline model”. Another stream of studies includes 
electoral system effects and political system format (Blais and Aarts 2006, Cox 1997, Franklin 
2004).  We claim that Romanian Diaspora voters participate in higher numbers in presidential 
elections when the number of voting stations increases. Romanian diaspora consistently votes 
with center right wing parties and candidates. This vote is associated with liberal policy 
preferences and support for issues that promote libertarian attitudes. We test these hypotheses 
with elections results data from 2000 to 2014 coupled with data collected from Votulmeu.com an 
online Voting Advice Application from the 2014 presidential elections in Romania.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Introduction 
 
The first round of the 2014 presidential elections in Romania predicted a comfortable win for the 
incumbent Prime Minister Victor Ponta, the president of the Social Democratic Party. After the 
first round, Ponta held a 10% lead over the Christian-Liberal Alliance ethnic German candidate 
Klaus Iohannis. The runoff campaign was marked by reports displayed on all TV channels 
showing the Romanian labor migrants not being able to vote abroad in the first round. 
Surprisingly, Klaus Iohannis, who obtained 54% of the votes, won the second round of elections. 
Romanian migrants queued at the Romanian embassies and consulates, massively mobilized via 
Facebook, and organized ad-hoc street protests in front of voting stations when they were not 
able to cast their votes. They overtly supported Iohannis for the second round of elections and 
reacted strongly against the Romanian government handling of external voting in the first 
election round.  The importance of the impact of migrant political behavior and attitudes is not 
singular to Romania. In Nigeria, president Jonathan contemplates on allowing Diaspora to vote 
starting 2015 (Adichie 2014) but only after the Nigerian Diaspora collected signatures to permit 
the right to vote and several protests. In Scotland, at the 2014 referendum, up to 800,000 Scottish 
people living in England expressed discontent about not having the opportunity to express their 
preferences (Mycock, 2014). In some rare cases, Diasporas had been a decisive effect on the 
national politics of origin countries. In 2006, in Italy, Romano Prodi won a majority in the 
Senate with the help of the expats voting abroad. In the United States, the military overseas 
played an important role in providing support for the republican candidate George W. Bush 
while, at the same time, the civilian elections were poorly organized (Christie 2004). For 
politicians and political scientist the political role of the emigrants is starting to become of 
particular concern. How does large-scale emigration affect the politics of the sending societies? 
Long concerned with question on when and why immigrants impact electoral politics few 
scholars started to investigate how does emigration impact the politics of the sending countries. 
This gap is troubling given the increasing number of emigrant populations that often cast a 
decisive vote in the country of origin electoral contests. To gain a complete understanding of the 
impact of emigrants on national politics and particularly if they are a distinct electoral block 
researchers must address certain puzzles. These include a comparison of emigrant and non-
emigrant political participation; whether emigrants vote differently than the citizens that did not 
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emigrate; institutional constraints on voting; determinants of emigrant voter turnout; and whether 
emigrants have different issues that determine their voting preferences than those that did not 
leave their country. There are a few studies that address the political preferences and partisan 
identities of emigrants. Admittedly this stream of research is facing the challenge of scarce data 
resources. This paper begins to fill this gap by investigating the political behavior of the emigrant 
population of one of the most important European countries with recently emigrated population: 
Romania. The aim is to evaluate the impact of emigration experience. As a first step the paper 
will ask whether the political participation of emigrants and their political preferences differ 
from the non-emigrant citizens. Namely we focus on elections results to tap party preferences 
and on preferences on key issues such as welfare state and minority rights. As a second step we 
explore the determinants of turnout by focusing on type of election and number of voting stations 
and find which political preferences determine voting intentions of emigrants compared to non-
emigrants.  
These issues are important in all countries of emigration but the investigation is focused on 
Romania for practical and theoretical reasons. Firstly emigrant political behavior and its impact 
on the politics of the country of origin is becoming a highly salient topic in Europe and it is 
likely to remains so in the future. Secondly most studies of emigrant impact on the politics of the 
sending country is focused on US and Mexico. Finally Romanian migrants have become 
important political actors in Romania. In the 2009 and 2014 presidential elections their 
contribution to the election results made former Prime Minister Adrian Nastase wonder whether 
emigrants should enjoy the political rights of the country they have left behind. From 2007, since 
Romania joined the European Union, to 2014 more than three million Romanians went abroad 
for work, study or join their families. The electoral strength of the emigrant Romanian electorate 
has prompted main political parties in Romanian to devise strategies and deliver promises to 
capture the emigrant vote, an entirely new phenomenon in Romanian politics. On a practical 
level, the election results of emigrant voting is provided at the voting section level by the 
National Electoral Authority. Secondly, the Voting Advice Application (an online application 
that compares the political preferences of users to political parties) “Votul meu” (My Vote) for 
the presidential elections in 2014 yielded approximately 1400 users, which voted abroad. 
Although fraught with issues of accurate representation, these data provide a rare opportunity to 
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survey the emigrant issue preferences and compare them to those that did not emigrate from 
Romania.  
The political participation of emigrants will be restricted to turnout. Voting is one of the most 
used forms of political participation. Building on these data we will take into account the 
variation in the institutional design type of elections and the number of voting stations in a 
country on turnout.  
We investigate the attitudes of emigrants on attitudes towards the market and minority rights 
(Kitschelt 1992). These issues have defined Romanian electoral politics since 1989 and are 
contested issues. We expect that that Romanian emigrants would be more supportive of the 
market and be more open to minority rights than non-emigrants. Further on, we explain how 
these preferences relate to partisan and presidential candidate support. We use regression to test 
whether migrant political preferences on issues affect their political choices they intend to make.  
The article proceeds as follows. The next section relates this study to the relevant literature on 
migrant political behavior followed by a short overview of Romanian post 1989 emigration 
history. We then turn to data analysis and discuss the evolution of emigrant political participation 
starting from 2004 and display the differences on political preferences between emigrants and 
non-migrants in Romania. Next we evaluate the impact type of elections, the number of voting 
sections on turnout followed by the assessment of the impact policy preferences have on 
emigrant political behavior. Conceptual fuzziness characterizes the usage of terms such as 
Diaspora, migrant, trans-national community or citizens living abroad (Sheffer 2003). This 
paper, due to the complexity of migration circumstances does not emphasize distinctions and 
characteristics. Most migrants can be qualified as “unskilled immigrant group that is locked into 
a subordinate status” (Cohen 1997, 163). Others are highly skilled and some are long settled 
while others are recent migrants. The reasons to migrate are also diverse. Some escaped their 
oppressive regimes; others left their country when the regime permitted, such as the Eastern 
Europeans. Some have and ideal view of their home community other despise it. Some plan to 
return while others do not know yet. Given that the focus of the project is on political 
participation, rights, attitudes and behavior there is no operational reason to differentiate among 
migrants and restrict the use of the term Diaspora. There is no cost associated with grouping 
migrants all together as Diaspora or emigrants since formally the country of origin treats them in 
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the same way. Diaspora, emigrants, migrants terms however do not include occasional visitors, 
tourists and business travelers.  
 
The Political Role of Romanian Migrants 
 
The story of emigration from Romania took place in three important historical stages. During 
communism, diaspora was largely dissident. Given the restrictions to travelling abroad, the 
Romanian politically active diasporic community was composed of people that emigrated 
illegally, were expelled by the communist authorities or chose not to return once they arrived to a 
democratic country risking their family’s safety back home. The Romanian dissidence movement 
was feeble (Angi 2011). Political participation occurred mainly through protests of intellectuals 
broadcasted through Radio Free Europe. Paul Goma, Mihai Botez and others issues 
communiques and open letters addressed to the communist leader Nicolae Ceausescu. Dissidents 
residing in Romania often wrote the letters. The Diaspora intermediated the publication of these 
documents altering the image of Ceausescu as a good communist friendly to Western European 
leaders.  The response of the communist regime was to try to repress Diaspora with the help of 
the Romanian Secret Police.  
The second stage began after the fall of the communist regime in December 1989 that 
emphasized the role of the kin communities living in the neighboring countries. The 1991 
Romanian constitution recognized the existence of Romanian communities abroad and 
established polling stations in embassies and consulates. The government focused on the 
strengthening of the ethnic identity of Romanians living in Hungary, Moldova, Ukraine and 
Serbia. Most of the initiatives focused on symbolic politics (Iordachi, 2004) to strengthen the 
existence of a transnational community.  
A wave of emigration took place in the years following the regime changes.  Nearly 100,000 
Romanians changed their residence to a domicile abroad. At the same time a wave of 
immigration took place from Moldova a country with a majority Romanian-speaking population. 
The majority of emigrants consisted of ethnic Germans and Hungarians. During communism the 
western Germany officials negotiated the emigration of ethnic Germans by offering money to the 
Romanian authorities for each person. In this way approximately 200,000 ethnic migrants left 
Romania (Adevarul.ro, 2010). After the regime change most ethnic Germans left Romania. 
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Citizenship problems with Hungary were complicated. In 2004 the Hungarian government 
organized a referendum to discuss the awarding of citizenship rights to the three million 
Hungarians living in Romania. The referendum was annulled due to low turnout. Later the 
Hungarian government adopted the “Act of Hungarians living in neighboring countries” that 
offered symbolic citizenship. A few years later the Hungarian government enacted the law that 
was defeated in referendum allowing anyone who could prove the Hungarian origin, to receive 
the Hungarian citizenship. The immigrants consisted of Moldovan citizens. The supporters of 
granting political rights to Diaspora successfully lobbied for Romanians living in Moldova to 
acquire Romanian citizenship. Around 200,000 Moldovan citizens received formal Romanian 
citizenship through this special procedure. The number of Moldovan citizens applying for 
Romanian citizenship increased after Romania joined the European Union. 
The third stage the focus on identity construction was replaced by economic concerns related to 
European labor migration. This process started in 2001 with the European Union officials’ 
decision to lift visa requirements for Romanian citizens. This decision was a first step that 
facilitated the access of Romanian to the EU labor market. The Spanish government was most 
visible in trying to employ a large number of temporary workers from Romania, a program hat 
was successful also due to the language similarities between Spanish and Romanian. In 2007, 
with Romania becoming a member of the European Union, the labor oriented migration 
accelerated. In 2008, Spanish and Italian authorities reported 1 million legal Romanian residents 
(Adevarul 2009). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a “Department for Relations of 
Romanians from Abroad” that elaborated policies related to the Romanians living abroad (Soros 
2009). In 2008 a new electoral law established special parliamentary seats for Romanians living 
abroad. Political parties focused their electoral campaigning in Italy and Spain. Attention to the 
votes from Diaspora was great during the 2009 presidential elections. The news media showed 
Romanians queuing. The process of voting took longer time because each voter had to fill in a 
form and sign a statement that they would not and did not vote in another polling station. Dues to 
the closeness of the election results the Diaspora’s vote input mattered determining the winner in 
these critical elections. The most contested voting station was in Paris where in 14 hours 3785 
voters casted a vote triggering suspicions of fraud. The vote recount did not result in a change of 
the final count. In 2014 attention to the votes of Diaspora became great again. In the first round 
of the presidential elections the new media showed again Romanians queuing at the Romanian 
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embassies and consulates. Several Romanians living abroad were not able to cast a vote due to 
the high participation. This lead to protests in UK, Germany, Austria, Belgium and Italy that 
were portrayed across European media. Representatives of Diaspora blamed the deficient 
organization of the electoral process by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and asked for more 
polling stations and voting booths for the second round of the presidential elections. The refusal 
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to respond to the demands of Diaspora lead to his resignation. 
Yet, in spite of the second round of elections taking place with two polling stations less the 
turnout of Diaspora doubled. In seven polling stations there were more than 4000 votes casted in 
14 hours. The highest reported turnout (4626) was at a voting station in London. Similarly to 
2009, the polling agencies projected Ponta as a winner. The next day, after the votes were 
counted from abroad the outcome was overturned. Iohannis gathered more than 89% from the 
Diaspora determining again the winner in a critical election. The next section reviews other 
studies that investigate the political role of emigrants. 
 
 
Migrant Political Behavior 
 
Most migration studies emphasize the political integration of migrants in the host community 
and analyze political participation from that perspective (Audebert and Dorai 2010, Baubock 
2006, Black et al. 2010, Dancygier and Saunders 2006, Dijstelbloem and Meijer 2011, Wallace 
and Stola 2001). These studies focus on political integration that seems to be dependent on how 
permissive is the host state with granting political rights (Martinielo 2006). There are two key 
approaches to the analysis of attitudes of migrants and their involvement in the politics of the 
country of origin. First there are examples where the granting of political rights is the result of 
emigrants pressuring governments in the country of origin. Migrants exert pressures the on less 
liberal regimes (Østergaard-Nielsen 2012, Koinova 2009) through lobying donor organizations 
(Koinova 2009) or sending out calls for democracy and human rights as it was the case for the 
diaspora of the former communist regimes in Eastern Europe (Falk 2003). Being offered an exit 
from the political system, dictators hoped to reduce the number of voices that support 
liberalization. In turn, migrants  became agents of democratization from outside. Opressive 
regimes attempted to reduce voting opportunities like in Zimbabwe where only military and 
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consular service officers living abroad are allowed to vote (Magaisa 2008) or in Uganda, Ghana, 
and Zimbabwe voting rights of the Diaspora were reduced (Boateng 2005). According to the 
second approach the political participation of migrants is shaped by a discussion about 
citizenship (Baubock 2006, Shevel 2014, Ziemer and Roberts 2013). Voting rights of a Diaspora 
confronts the question regarding the appropriate conceptualization of a political community that 
increasingly becomes mobile. On the one hand extending voting rights to expatriates is the main 
element of political integration with the goal of full political inclusion for all of a nation’s 
citizens and social groups. On the other hand expatriates are seen as renegades who should not 
be permitted a say in government selection since they are not affected to the same extent by its 
decisions, laws, and regulations as citizens living in the home country. If one is to follow the 
principle of “No Taxation Without Representation,” migrants that do not pay taxes in the home 
country should not have political rights. In both instances the Diaspora is often a marginalized 
category, both by the country of origin that views them as outside the political community and 
by a host country that views them as foreign, temporary, and perhaps, second-class inhabitants. 
States in transition are more likely to enfranchise groups that were previously excluded or 
marginal or enemies to national politics (Østergaard-Nielsen 2012, 72). There are significant 
examples of countries that extended the rights of migrants (IDEA 2007) during transition from 
authoritarian rule. The political influence of migrants in the country of origin is especially 
important in the context of the wave of migration from East-Central Europe to Western Europe. 
The type of migration that occurs from East to West is liquid (Snel et al. 2006) with temporary 
migrants going back and forth and having a more determined goal to settle in the home country. 
However, these approaches do not sufficiently consider the impact of the behavior and attitudes 
of emigrants towards the democratic political process of the country of origin. The former 
emphasizes the pressure for liberalization of authoritarian regimes and focuses less on 
consolidation of democracy.  The latter focuses on normative discussions of citizenship rights in 
the origin and host countries and less on their use and impact on the attitudes of migrants 
(Baubock 2006).  
The political participation of Diaspora in the origin country is an increasingly relevant 
phenomenon (except: Baubock 2006, Martinielo 2006, Burean 2011, Ostengaard and Ciornei 
2012). Findings show that granting voting rights to Diaspora accelerates the diffusion of liberal 
principles to neighboring countries (Turcu and Urbatsch 2015). In Mexico, migrants remit 
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democracy through external lobbying, voting from abroad and, upon return, by influencing 
others to be involved in politics (Perez-Armedaniz and Crow 2010). In Eastern European 
countries returned migrants have political attitudes that support European Union institutions and 
inherit a stronger sense of political efficacy (Careja and Emmeneger 2012).   
Voting is one of the most popular forms of political participation (Blais 2000) and is an indicator 
of democratic quality (Fieldhouse et al. 2007). Increasing turnout has become an important 
objective in Europe especially following the lowering turnout rates in national (Rubenson et al. 
2007) but mostly in European elections. One method to foster turnout is by facilitating access to 
vote for excluded or marginalized groups. Lowering the voting age (Wagner et al 2012) 
produced positive effects in increasing turnout. Allowing migrants to vote at elections could be 
one method of increasing turnout and improving the democratic quality of a state.  
There is a substantial amount of research dedicated to turnout (Blais 2000, Franklin 2004, Blais, 
Massicotte and Dobrzynska 2003). Generally, turnout (Blais and Aarts, 2006) is increased by 
compulsory voting, registration to vote and the salience of elections. Romanian migrants turn out 
to vote in countries where the number of voting station is increased (Burean 2011). More 
Romanians voting abroad turn out to vote in presidential elections and in countries that are more 
democratic (Burean 2011). The adoption of certain rules that facilitate voting does not 
necessarily foster higher turnout (Blais 2007). Blais, Massicotte and Dobrzynska (2002), 
Franklin (1996) and Norris (2004) find inconsistent results in decreasing the costs of voting. 
However, for migrants, the impact of lowering the costs of voting can have substantial effects. 
That is because unlike for voters that vote at their residential area migrants’ voting costs can be 
substantially higher. To rephrase Blais (2000, 89) for migrants the substantial decrease in the 
cost of voting matters substantially. Shortening the distance between voters and their voting 
stations by creating more voting booths or simplifying the vote (no registration) has a positive 
impact on turnout (Burean 2011).  Therefore lowering the voting costs, such as increasing the 
number of voting stations (Hypothesis 1) increases turnout. 
The type of elections migrants participate in seems to matter. Generally, turnout is higher in 
presidential elections and lower in local elections (Blais 2007). Turnout in legislative elections is 
weaker where the president matters more (Siaroff and Merre 2002). We hypothesize that the 
presidential elections to bring more emigrants to the polls (Hypothesis 2). 
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Emigration is a result of an individual-self selection process that would yield systemic 
differences between emigrant and the non-migrant population.  
The presence of migrants changes attitudes in host and origin countries (De Haas 2005) 
especially when migrants’ socio economic status suffers dramatic changes (van Meeteren, 
Engbersen and van San 2009). One might postulate the economic interests would dictate 
preferences for candidates that encourage less redistribution and more private economic 
initiative. Few studies ask whether migrants acquire democratic attitudes and become agents of 
democratization in their home countries. Mexican migrants that live in the United States remit 
democratization from abroad by voting and pressuring authorities of the country of origin for 
reforms. Careja and Emmeneger (2012) find that the financially successful return migrants from 
Eastern Europe have a stronger sense of political efficacy, are more satisfied with democracy and 
have a higher support for the EU.  
Political attitudes are influenced by socio demographic characteristics (Almond and Verba 1989) 
and institutional context (Anderson and Tverdova 2011). The reason to emigrate is a factor that 
significantly impacts the granting of voting rights. Refugees from war torn countries, political 
asylum recipients can have stronger pro democratic attitudes. At the same time ethnic emigrants 
would have more hostile attitudes towards the political system of the country of origin (Koinova 
2009).  
The emigration experience in a consolidated democracy increases satisfaction with democracy 
(Careja and Emmeneger 2012, Perez-Armedaniz and Crow, 2010, Camp 2003) although some of 
the temporary migrants have minimal contact with the host country and rely on the bonding 
social capital of their co nationals. Yet financial success can have positive effects towards the 
attitudes towards the regime, political participation and political interest (Mishler and Rose 2001, 
Williams and Balaz 2006) of the host country with spills over effects on evaluations of the 
regime in the country of origin. Hence migrants have more liberal values than non-migrants. I 
expect emigrants to have more liberal preferences on economy and on granting minority rights 
(Hypothesis 3). These translate in support for parties that promise radical reforms that take the 
shape of new political parties and presidential candidates that are independent from the old 
political parties (Hypothesis 4). Controls include socio-demographics (education, age, gender), 
past vote, party identification and political interest. 
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Methodology 
This is a case study on the political participation and voting behavior of the emigrants from 
Romania. As a case study its relevance relies on inspecting a phenomenon that is deviant from 
the classical studies of voting behavior and political participation and it has a potential impact on 
comparative studies. This study is relevant in the sense that it takes into account, besides the 
classical determinants of political supports, the experience of migration. This element seems to 
be particularly important in the Romanian context. The paper investigates what motivates 
Romanian migrants to have center-right, liberal political preferences. More generally it tries to 
understand emigrants role in the politics of the country of origin by describing a case where this 
has implications on who gets elected in the presidential office. The selection of the 2014 
presidential elections data is fortunate. Similarly to 2009, the Romanian Diaspora’s electoral 
support for the candidate of the center right National Liberal Party produced a stunning result 
with Klaus Iohannis gaining on the 10% deficit he had in the first round of the 2014 Romanian 
presidential elections and ultimately winning the elections.   
The relationship between turnout, number of voting stations and type of elections is investigated 
through cross tabulations of elections results gathered from the website of the Permanent 
Electoral Authority. Voting behavior is operationalized as a dummy variable that measures the 
vote for Klaus Iohannis. The Romanian VAA Votulmeu.com data contains thirty questions on 
issues and a few socio demographics.  The selection of the most important issues is done with 
Mokken scaling that led to the selection of eight issues that seem to compose an economic and a 
distribution of rights dimension. The left right self-placement taps on the level of economic 
liberalism. The GAL-TAN tests users permissiveness on the distribution on rights. These were 
transformed into dummy variables that measure the economic liberal placement and liberal 
distribution of rights. Candidate selection variable taps on whether the candidate is preferred 
because of the ideas she/he promotes and it is also a dichotomous variable.  The preference for 
issues where transformed into dichotomous variables and measure support for an issue. Table 4 
shows the eight issues that were identified as relevant. Socio demographics include age, 
measured through the year of birth, gender and education. The education variable separates 
university graduates from other citizens. We use binomial logistic regression since the dependent 
variable is nominal and independent variables are dichotomous and continuous (age). The 
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estimates we use are b logit coefficients that measure the direction of the relationship between 
variables. There are three types of predictors used: socio-demographic variables (age, gender, 
education), political variables (party identification with a center right party, past reported vote, 
interest in politics) and issues (reason for the selection of the candidate, GAL-TAN, left-right, 
support for private health care, reduce public sector, market economy, gay rights, use of 
marijuana, abortion, religion in school, church in public life). These are added one at a time to 
evaluate their effects when introduced as a set of explanatory variables. 
The first set of regressions uses the entire database to assess the effect of what Dancygier and 
Saunders (2006) in a similar study on immigrants termed the self-selection hypothesis (p.967) 
that measures the opinion gaps among migrants and population that does not migrate. This 
hypothesis explains the inherent differences that result from the different life experiences of 
migrants and non-migrants. The second set of regressions are done on the migrant and non 
emigrant population in order to observe if the explanatory predictors have different effects on 
emigrants from non-migrants.  
 
Data 
The scope of the paper is to link the turnout and the election results to information about 
emigrant programmatic preferences with the help of data obtained from the Voting Advice 
Application, hereafter “VAA”. The online revolution proved to be a solid ground for the 
development of VAAs. Created initially as paper-and-pencil tests in the late 1990s (Ruusuvirta, 
2010, Gemenis and Rosema, 2014), VAAs became used worldwide, with millions of users 
seeking advice during electoral campaigns. Initially implemented in the Netherlands, then 
Switzerland and Germany, VAAs are now present in almost all European countries (exceptions 
are Malta and Slovenia) (Garzia and Marschall, 2012). VAAs are present in second-order 
elections as well, with the EU Profiler and EUvox in the elections for the European parliament in 
2009 and 2014. VAAs are campaigning tools that eliminate the cost of information, offering a 
tailored advice, simulating the context of full information. The growing importance of issue 
voting (Dalton, 1996, Franklin et al., 2009) following Downs (1957) spatial model, where every 
policy can be placed on a left-right continuum, is accommodated by the VAAs (Cedroni and 
Garzia, 2010). In order for issue voting to be meaningful, voters have to have clear issue 
preferences, parties have to compete over the same policy issues (Nie and Verba, 1979) and 
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voters have to be able to identify their position relative to the position of parties (Butler and 
Stokes 1969). VAAs help voters in making more informed political decisions, lowering the costs 
of information, by presenting to the voter the parties' position on salient policy positions, by 
comparing, based on an algorithm, the position of the user with the position of the parties, and 
presenting the user with a rank-order list of parties, following a proximity logic (Cedroni and 
Garzia, 2010). As a web survey tool, the quality of VAA data suffers from overall survey error, 
made out of coverage error, sampling error, non-response error and measuring error 
(Dilman,  2011 in Andreadis, 2014). Coverage error occurs when part of the population cannot 
be included in the sample; in the case of VAAs, this has to do with Internet usage, more 
specifically with the Internet penetration rate and Internet literacy. Sampling error represents the 
inaccuracy in estimating a certain quantity based on the sample, when the entire population is not 
available; here, the sampling error has to do with the self-selection bias of users into using the 
tool. Non-response error occurs when users do not respond to questions, and this pattern can be 
discerned when compared to the answers of other users. Measurement error occurs when the 
answers provided by the users are wrong or inaccurate (Andreadis, 2014). 
VAA sites attract many users, generating very large datasets on the political preferences of its 
users. Additionally, users can fill out the pop-up survey, which contains questions on socio-
demographics, such as age, gender, occupation, as well as further questions about their party 
affiliation. VAA generated data have increasingly been used as a substitute for survey data for 
explaining political phenomena as positioning of parties and voters and voting behavior. 
Although extremely cost effective, the use of this type of data is criticized. This is due to the bias 
the VAA generated data caries. The most important caveat one has to acknowledge when dealing 
with VAA is that the data is not representative of the population at large. More precisely, the 
data is biased towards the young, better educated (Marschall and Schultze, 2012), from urban 
areas, with more left-wing orientation (Mendez and Wheatley, 2014). An additional bias is 
represented by the gender, with two-thirds of the respondents being male (Mendez and Wheatley 
2014). The Romanian VAA Votulmeu.com organized for the 2014 presidential elections 
contained 18000 users. 1441 declared that they vote abroad. Despite its obvious limitations this 
data offers a chance to glance at the issue preferences of Romanian emigrants. Thus this 
application offers a unique chance to access a population that is often not present in surveys. 
Although some research institutes such as CURS and Metromedia Transylvania implemented 
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surveys on Romanian migrants living abroad they do not contain information about their voting 
behavior and programmatic preferences. One way to find surveys that include migrants from 
Romania is to find them with in the Eurobarometer data following the Careja and Emmeneger 
(2012) study. This was not a successful solution due to the extremely small number of citizens 
that were living outside Romania and declared themselves as coming from Romania in the 2014 
Eurobarometer surveys. Not having an accurate picture of the emigrating population of Romania 
makes it difficult to assess the representativeness of the 1441 Romanians that declared that they 
would vote abroad and used the Romanian VAA.  The users of the 2014 VAA are highly 
educated, young and predominantly male. Thus the interpretation of these data has to be done by 
having in mind these serious limitations. 
 
Turnout, Type of Election and the Number of Polling Stations 
The survey of electoral results permits ecological analyses of the determinants of turnout of 
Romanian that vote abroad and their political preferences. The National Electoral Authority 
made the data on Diaspora available. This department publishes the number of migrant voters 
who turned out for every election since 2000 the total number, for individual country and for 
each voting station abroad. The voting preferences of migrants are available since 2007 at an 
aggregate level. Since 2008 these results are published at the voting station level for 
parliamentary, euro elections, referenda and the first and second rounds of presidential elections.  
It is a challenge however to estimate the percentage of Romanians that lives abroad and that 
participates in elections. Previous estimates (Burean 2011) claim that around 1,7 million voting 
Romanians live abroad. This figure was computed as a sum of official reports from the Italian 
and Spanish authorities where most Romanian migrants live. I used census data to find out how 
many children live in Romania subtracted children from the reports given by Spanish and Italian 
authorities. Specific data about the turnout of Romanians that live abroad are available only since 
2000. Up until 2008 all votes from abroad were summed up to one electoral district in Bucharest. 
The percentage of Romanians voting abroad is low when compared to the estimate of 1,7 million 
voters. The peak turnout was registered in the 2014 presidential elections in which 22% of the 
emigrant voting population participated. One explanation for the low turnout is that citizens are 
not especially interested in the politics of their home country since they do not seem to be 
directly affected.  
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From 2000 to 2014 there is a gradual increase in turnout (Table 1). The increase must be viewed 
with caution. One reason is that simply more Romanians went abroad when the visa 
requirements were lifted in 2002 and with Romania joining the EU in 2007. This trend continues 
after 2007. Turnout correlates with the number of voting stations and the type of elections. 
Presidential elections bring more migrants to the polls while European elections and 
parliamentary elections bring the least voters confirming the interest only for elections that 
involve the president viewed as a symbol of the nation. Another explanation for the low turnout 
is the time, expense and the energy required by the Diaspora to vote. Therefore the number of 
voting stations for Romanians should lead to an increase in turnout. Other tools of reducing 
voting costs include e-voting, postal vote or vote by proxy. However these alternatives require 
some sort of registration system. Table 1 shows that the number of voting stations nearly doubled 
from 152 in 2000 to 306 in 2012 and witnessed a small decline to 292 in the second round of the 
2014 presidential elections. The greatest increase in polling stations occurred in Italy (from 2 in 
2000 to 55 in 2009 and to 51 in 2014) in Spain (from 1 in 2000 to 38 in 2014) and in Moldova 
(from 1 in 2000 to 13 in 2009 and 21 in 2014). In other countries the number of voting stations 
fluctuated. In Great Britain from one voting station in 2000 it to fourteen in 2008, 8 in 2009 to 11 
in 2014. In USA there were 21 polls in 2000, 30 in 2008, 29 on 2009 and 22 in 2014. In France 
the number of voting stations decreased from 10 to 8 and in Poland it increased from 1 in 2009 to 
3 in 2014. Most of the countries had less out of the 96 had less than three voting stations with 
minor variations. Voter turnout witnessed large variations. In 2000 in Italy there were less than 
1000 voters. In the 2004 this number quadrupled. In 2009 42,676 turned out to vote in the runoff 
presidential elections. In 2014, 96600 turned out to vote. A similar increase is to be observed in 
Spain, Moldova, Germany, Great Britain, USA and Austria. In Spain from 809 voters in 2000, 
and 35911 in 2009, the turnout increased to 82744. In Germany the turnout increased from 1709 
in 2000 to 17506 in 2014 while in the UK it jumped from 616 voters in 2000 to 25850 in 2014. 
USA and Austria showed similar trends. In the US the turnout increased from 6276 (2000) to 
17683 (2014) while in Austria with no change in the number of voting stations it increased from 
678 (in 2000) to 9533 (in 2014). From the data in aggregate and in country-by-country it seems 
plausible that the number of voting stations had a positive effect. The data reported from the 
National Electoral Authority reports the number of voting stations and turnout for every country. 
Treating each country for each election as a separate case (n=1682) the correlation between 
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turnout and the number of polling station is strong (r = 0.724). The correlation is strong even 
after subdividing the data by type of election (parliamentary r = .852, presidential r = .814, 
referendum r=.818, Euroelections = .589). Regression analysis permitted the analyses of the 
influence of polling station number and type of elections as a series of dummies. The effect of 
the number of polling station is dramatic (b= 626.643 se=14.53). An increase in the number of 
voting stations brings more citizens to vote. Presidential elections bring more voters to the polls. 
The increase of voting stations where there are migrants improves the voting conditions and 
boosts turnout. The next section focuses on the voting preferences of the Diaspora and attempt to 
provide an explanation for the 2014 election results. 
 
--Table 1-- 
 
 
 
Political Preferences of Romanian Emigrants 
Klaus Iohannis obtained 89,73% of the migrant vote in the 2014 presidential second-round 
runoff, receiving 338,873 of the 377,651 votes. His majority helped in winning him the 
presidency. Iohannis garnered almost three times the number of votes than the previous president 
Traian Basescu (115,831).  It is not surprising that Iohannis was popular in Diaspora. Candidates 
from center right parties perform better than candidates of the left. This claim holds for the 
Czech and the Polish Diaspora (Doyle and Fidrmuc 2005). Table 2 records the vote of the 
Romanian Diaspora since 2007. The vote percentages for the main Romanian political parties 
show a remarkable consistency in the vote. PD-L, PNL, ARD (The Right Romania Alliance) was 
a plurality winner in elections until 2012. Since then new parties and their candidates became 
increasingly popular with Diaspora. In the 2014 EP elections it was PMP (Popular Movement 
Party) that won the elections in Diaspora with 28.63% of the valid votes. In the first round 2014 
presidential elections Monica Macovei independent candidate came in third (24,342) just behind 
Victor Ponta (25,466 votes) and in front of Elena Udrea (15,656). Thus even if there is a shift in 
the Diaspora vote to new parties, this shift remains within the center-right ideological camp. PSD 
never won more than one fifth of the vote in Diaspora. 
--Table 2 -- 
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Not surprisingly in Iohannis was the plurality winner in the first round of the presidential 
election garnering 46% of the vote. What was surprising that in the second round similarly to the 
former president Basescu in 2009 he increased dramatically his margin in the second round 
compared to the first round of elections. In Romania it was Victor Ponta that was the plurality 
winner having a 10% advantage against Iohannis. In the second round Iohannis increased his 
margin with 14% compared to the extra five percentage points obtained by Ponta. In the 
Diaspora, Iohannis’s percentage grew by 43 percentage points while Ponta’s percentage points 
actually decreased with 5%. Iohannis’s gain was double than that of Basescu in 2009. This is not 
necessarily a result that shows that even Ponta’s voters shifted their votes to Iohannis. It might be 
an effect of the more than doubling of the turnout between the first and the second round. 
Perhaps the turnout increased because Diaspora anticipated a second round and given the 
difficulties related to travel many decided to vote only in the second round. It is thus more likely 
that the increasing support for Iohannis came from new voters that showed up in the second 
round. A geographical inspection seems unnecessary to see where the votes for Iohannis came 
from. Starting the 2009 elections it is possible to scrutinize the country-level voting results for 
the Romanians that cast a vote outside the borders of Romania. The support for Iohannis was 
uniformly strong across all continents. Compared to Basescu in 2009, in the first round Iohannis 
won in 89 out of the 95 countries that had polling stations for Romanians. Iohannis lost elections 
in North Korea to Victor Ponta (by one vote out of the 7 casted votes) and in Brazil (by 3 votes), 
in Cuba to Monica Macovei (by one vote out of the 22 votes) and not surprisingly, in Hungary, 
to Kelemen Hunor. He had the same amount of votes with Ponta and Macovei (5 votes) in 
Angola and he had the equal number of votes with Victor Ponta (5) in Armenia. In the second 
round, Iohannis won in 93 of the 94 countries where voting polls existed. Klaus Iohannis lost to 
Victor Ponta in Palestine by one vote. Ponta obtained 10 votes and Iohannis 9. In 27 countries, 
Iohannis obtained more than 90% of the vote. These include countries where there are many 
Romanian migrants. These include Spain, United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, 
Canada, Ireland and Austria. In Italy he obtained 88% of the votes. Iohannis’s triumph among 
Romanian migrants was overwhelming. A more systematic analysis is required to better 
understand the variation for the support for Iohannis in the first round. Given the extremely 
limited availability of surveys on political preferences of migrants and especially the surveys of 
Romanian migrants in 2014, we decided to use to make use of the data available from the VAA 
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Votulmeu.com. Out of the more than 18000 users we could identify 1441 persons that declared 
that they would vote abroad. These data are not a representative sample of Romanian migrants. 
More than 70% of the users that declared that they vote abroad have graduated a university and 
nearly half of them have post graduate studies. Half of them are male. The data excludes the 
migrants that do not know how to use a computer. Yet given this severe limitations one could get 
an estimate of the opinions of an elite of migrants that are also more likely to turn out to vote and 
are interested in politics. Table 3 compares the elections results with the voting intentions of 
users of the VAA. Voters of Victor Ponta are severely under represented while the supporters of 
Monica Macovei are over represented.  
---Table 3--- 
 
Next, using a dimension reduction technique, out of the thirty statements we identified eight 
issues that compose an economic and a distribution of rights dimension (Table 4). Then we 
compared the political preferences of VAA users that declared that they would vote abroad to 
those voting domestically. The data support the center right orientation of migrants (Table 5). On 
economic issues migrant users support a pro-market type of economy similarly to the non-
migrant users. On the distribution of rights migrants support to a greater extent gay rights (19 
percentage point more in favor) and are more pro-choice (7% more) while non-migrants are 
more supportive to teach religion in public schools (7% more). The VAA application contained 
several socio demographic and political preference questions such as past vote behavior, party 
identification, political interest, voting intention, left right self placement and the reasons for 
choosing a presidential candidate. Thus using binomial regression we tested for three categories 
of likely determinants of the vote for Iohannis: socio-demographics, political variables and 
preferences on issues. We added a Migrant dummy variable to find out whether being a migrant 
has an effect on the voting preference controlling for other possible determinants (Table 6). The 
results show that being a migrant is related to a decreased likelihood to vote for Iohannis. This 
affect however disappears once the “reason for selecting the candidate”. This variable separates 
those that declared that they vote candidate because of his ideas or for some other reasons. The 
results show that the strongest predictor for the vote for Iohannis is identification with a center-
right party. Iohannis it is more likely to be voted by those that feel close to a center right party, 
did not vote in the previous elections that did not choose him because of his ideas and support 
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religion in schools (Table 6). Next we compared the predictors for the vote for Iohannis for 
migrants with on-migrants (Table 7). The results show that Iohannis attracted new migrant voters 
that feel close to center right wing political parties and did not choose him because of his ideas. 
There was no effect of issue voting for migrants or non-migrants.   
---Table 6--- 
---Table 7--- 
The data show statistical associations between the support for Iohannis and party identification, 
past voting behavior but not issues and socio-demographic variables. The strongest predictor 
found was the identification with a right-wing political party and past voting behavior. What is 
interesting is that migrant voters are more likely to be inclusive with gay rights, are pro-choice 
and reject religion in schools. Is it likely that the Romanians living abroad have internalized the 
values and the practices of the host country?  Did the fact the most members of Diaspora live in 
consolidated democracies that are economically developed influenced their attitudes to support 
Iohannis? It might be that Diaspora not only acts as a catalyst for economic reform but they act 
through their political preferences that are influenced by their experiences. The analysis of the 
group of migrants that completed the VAA “Votulmeu” seems to confirm former question and 
refute the second. Alternatively it is more likely that self-selected pro reform individuals chose to 
live abroad and they are the driving force of electoral engagement abroad. I found that these 
individuals are not much different from the self-selected pro reform individuals that use the 
Internet and did not migrate. Much further data and better quality surveys are necessary before 
one would be able to link personal experience abroad to support for political parties that promise 
reform and change in a democratizing country. 
 
Conclusion 
Presidential elections in Romania seem to become peculiar events for the Romanian Diaspora. In 
2009 the presidential elections brought the highest number of Romanian migrants to the polls. In 
2014 this number more than doubled. It is the second time that the Romanian diaspora votes are 
decisive for settling the victor in the presidential elections.  
Most research on labor migrants focuses on granting formal citizenship rights, the impact of 
economic remittance but not on political influence. The research on the political role of migrants 
is scarce. The issue becomes news depending on the closeness of the electoral contest because 
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there are simply to few migrants that vote, to influence the electoral context. This paper 
presented an apathetic Romanian diaspora that is absent from elections even if since the 2009 
presidential elections the number of voters more than doubled. By increasing the number of 
voting stations where it matters facilitates turnout. Presidential elections bring more migrants to 
the polls. The paper examined the political preferences of migrants by inspecting elections 
results and a group of Romanian VAA users that intended to vote abroad. The election results 
show that Diaspora prefers to vote center-right parties and since 2012 favor new political parties 
as well. This aided the support for Klaus Iohannis. We found that although the electoral 
preferences of migrants are different from non-migrants they are not that different from the self 
selected individuals that completed the VAA application Votulmeu. Moreover the migrant status 
is not associated with support for Iohannis. Migrants that did not previously vote and have 
center-right wing party attachments support Iohannis. This argument holds true for the online 
users of VAA that do not migrate. More migrants supports gay marriage and less influence of 
religion in school and are pro choice. These attitudes do not translate in support for any political 
party. Further research depends on the availability of data. Ideally we have to take into account 
the years spent abroad, the tendency to turn back, income level, work status, access to media, 
integration in the receiving country and exposure to values of the receiving country. The political 
influence of Romanian migrants has increased despite the lack of interest and difficulty to cast a 
vote and it seems to decisive when elections are close and every vote matters. It is more likely 
that new migrant voters, that feel close to a party to turnout and vote for their party. This means 
that political parties should invest more in mobilizing the electorate that lives abroad and not 
take their votes for granted. 
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Table 1 Turnout of Romanians Living Abroad and Number of  
Voting Stations, 2000-2014 
 
Type of Election   Year      Turnout Voting Stations   Countries 
Parliament/President 1st Rd   2000       33,169         152  88 
President 2nd Rd   2000       16,331         152  88 
Parliament/President 1st Rd  2004       40,868         153  96 
President 2nd Rd     2004       40,149         153  96 
President Dismissal Referendum 2007       75,027         186  95 
European Parliament  2007       22,557         190  88  
Parliament   2008       24,008         221  93 
European Parliament  2009       14,330         190  94 
President 1st Round  2009       94,305         294  97 
President 2nd Round  2009     147,795         294  97 
President Dismissal Referendum     2012      58,416            306               95 
Parliamentary                                   2012       60,878           300               95 
European Parliament                        2014      30,248           190                92 
Presidential 1st Round                      2014     161,262           294               95 
Presidential 2nd Round                     2014     375,743           292               94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Vote Preferences of the Romanian Diaspora 
By Percentage of Valid Votes Cast 
 
     PSD PD-L PNL      UDMR      USL         ARD    Other       
2007 European Parliament    8.84 44.10 10.31   2.78                                 33.97 
2008 Chamber of Deputies 15.17 46.52 21.22   4.21                                 12.87 
2008 Senate   13.23 46.46 23.52   5.12                                 11.67 
2009 European Parliament  14.87 37.13 15.68   7.16                                 25.16 
2009 President-First Round 12.41 56.05 17.43   1.06                                 13.05 
2009 President-Second Round 21.14 78.86 
2012 Chamber of Deputies                 -             -               -          1.89        27.32       27.27     43.52    
2012 Senate                                         -            -                -          1.53        28.37      39.46     30.64      
2014 European Parliament               11.05     15.71       8.63        1.22                                     63.39 
2014 President-First Round             15.90       -            46.17       0.54                                     37.39   
2014 President-Second Round         10.26                    89.73        
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Table 3  Voting intentions of VAA users compared to election results 
 
                                                    VAA                   2014 Election results first round  
Voting intentions           migrants    non-migrants         migrants   all voters 
 
Klaus Iohannis                   34.5          40.4                     46.17      30.37 
Victor Ponta                         1.7           4.8                      15.9        40.44 
Monica Macovei                53.7          38.0                     15.2          4.44 
Others                                10.1           16.8                    22.73      24.75 
 
 
 
Table 4 Relevant dimensions identified through Mokken scaling (items that have a homogeneity coefficient higher 
than 0.3 the threshold for scalable items) 
Economy                                                                                                           0.365 
The free economic competition makes the health system work better             0.340 
The number of employees from the public sector should be reduced               0.363 
The state should intervene as least as possible in the economy                        0.391 
Society                                                                                                               0.426 
Homosexual couples should enjoy the same rights as heterosexual couples    0.442 
The usage of cannabis as a recreational drug should be legal                           0.394 
Women should have the right to decide in matters connected to abortion        0.423  
Religion should be a compulsory course in public schools                               0.448 
The state should offer a privileged status to the Orthodox Church                   0.421 
(Mokken analysis performed by Vasilis Manavopoulos: vmanavopoulos@gmail.com) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5  Political preferences on issues of migrants and non-migrants (percentage agreeing) 
Economy                                                                                                      migrants  non-migrants 
The free economic competition makes the health system work better            57.2           60.3  
The number of employees from the public sector should be reduced             65.8           65.5 
The state should intervene as least as possible in the economy                      50.6           55.1 
Society                                                                                                                
Homosexual couples should enjoy the same rights as heterosexual couples  74.6           55.6   
The usage of cannabis as a recreational drug should be legal                         49.9           41.6   
Women should have the right to decide in matters connected to abortion      91.1           84.6   
Religion should be a compulsory course in public schools                             9.3             16.3   
The state should offer a privileged status to the Orthodox Church                 3.2               4.7  
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Table 6 Determinants of voting intentions of VAA users 
The dependent variable is vote for Iohanis (logit estimates and standard errors in parantheses) 
 
Age                                     .007**     .003      -.005 
                                           (.002)     (.003)    (.005) 
Gender                              .046        .007        .027 
                                           (.043)      (.071)    (.114) 
Education                       -.163*      -.036        -.196 
                                             (.055)     (.091)     (.139) 
Migrant                          -.268**      -.299*     -.139 
                                          (.072)       (.125)      (.178) 
Interest in politics                          -.239*      -.165 
                                                        (.097)        (.157) 
Past Voting Behavior                    -.236**      -.300* 
                                                            (.088)         (.134) 
Center-right party                          2.424*** 2.587*** 
  identification                                 (.099)       (.166) 
                                                                 
Candidate selection                                        -.589***                         
/programmatic                                                (.105)   
 
GAL-TAN                                                                -.018       
                                                                                (.117) 
Left-Right                                                            .275        
                                                                              (.157) 
Private health care                                          -.047          
                                                                               (.116)  
Reduce public sector                                       -.009           
                                                                               (.127) 
Market economy                                               -.110          
                                                                                (.119) 
Gay rights                                                            -.068        
                                                                               (.118) 
Marijuana use                                                    -.099 
                                                                                (.115)         
Pro-choice                                                           -.034 
                                                                                (.163) 
Religion in school                                              .230        
                                                                               (.171) 
Pro-church                                                         -.592*      
                                                                               (.273) 
 
Constant              -13.954***       -8.591***   7.787 
                               (4.379)              (6.701)      (10.415) 
Nagelkerke R       .006                .255                .289 
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Table 7 Determinants of voting intentions of VAA users migrants and non migrants compared (the vote for Iohannis 
is the dependent variable-logit estimates) 
 
Vote for Iohannis                      non-migrants                                  migrants 
Age                                     .014***       .010**       .002                   .025**         .028     .045 
                                           (.003)           (.004)       (.006)               (.010)        (.015)      (.025) 
Gender                                .059            .031               .029              .139         -.086        .033 
                                           (.061)        (.070)            (.115)               (.137)        (.221)     (.376)  
Education                          -.121           -.107           -.136                 -.265          -.143       .067 
                                          (.066)         (.075)       (.120)                   (.196)          (.313)     (.451) 
Interest in politics                                -.553***     -.488***                               .374        .586 
                                                            (.085)       (.144)                                     (.314)      (.523) 
Past Voting Behavior                         -.334***      -.364**                              -.421      -.861* 
                                                            (.076)          (.120)                                 (.224)      (.348) 
Center-Right Party                               1.546***    1.682***                            1.108***  1.319** 
  Identification                                      (.072)        (.113)                                  (.261)     (.429) 
                                                             
Candidate selection                                                  -.880***                                           -.735* 
/programmatic                                                           (.113)                                               (.344) 
GAL-TAN                                                                 .035                                                  .406 
                                                                                  (.121)                                                (.312) 
Left-Right                                                                 -.507**                                                .534 
                                                                                  (.169)                                                (.429) 
Private health care                                                   -.080                                                 -.211 
                                                                                  (.118)                                              (.343) 
Reduce public sector                                                 -.086                                              -.786 
                                                                                    (.124)                                             (.405) 
Market economy                                                        -.113                                                  .344 
                                                                                    (.122)                                              (.388) 
Gay rights                                                                   -.107                                                 -.652 
                                                                                    (.128)                                                 (.465) 
Marijuana use                                                              .082                                               -.069 
                                                                                    (.123)                                              (.364) 
Pro-choice                                                                   -.179                                                -.136 
                                                                                   (.168)                                                (.594) 
Religion in school                                                     .151                                                  .674 
                                                                                 (.171)                                               (.854) 
Pro-church                                                              -.551                                                   -.209 
                                                                               (.290)                                                  (.845) 
Constant          -24.418***     -21.340**             -2.583        -49.797***   -56.893*** -89.802*** 
                             (6.317)          (7.411)             (11.983)   (19.239)           (30.028) 
Nagelkerke R    .010              .172                        .243          .015                .105               .239 
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Appendix 
Independent variables 
Socio-Demographic variables 
Migrant: This variable is coded 2 if a respondent declared that he/she will vote abroad and 0 
otherwise. This coding is intended to make the clearest possible distinction between a migrant 
and a person that is not an emigrant.  
Age: the respondents’ year of birth 
Gender: A dichotomous variable coded 1 for males and 2 for females 
Education: An ordinal variable transformed in a dichotomous variable in which 2 represent 
respondents with graduate and postgraduate studies (BA, MA, PhD) and 1 is high school 
graduate and under 
 
Political variables 
Interest in politics: An ordinal variable transformed in a dichotomous variable in which 2 
represents “I am very interested” and “somewhat interested” while 1 is represented by “I am 
little interested” and “I am not interested at all” 
Past voting behavior: An ordinal variable transformed into a dichotomous variables in which 2 is 
represented by the persons that have voted and 1 by those who have not or did not remember that 
they have voted. 
Center-right party identification: An ordinal variable transformed into a dichotomous variable in 
which 2 is represented by whoever declared that they feel close to PNL (National Liberal Party), 
PDL (The Democratic Liberal Party) or PMP (The Popular Movement Party) and 1 by all the 
others. 
Issue variables 
Candidate selection/ programmatic:  It is the recoded answers to the question “What is the main 
reason you have chosen this candidate”. It is an ordinal variable transformed into a dichotomous 
variable in which 2 is represented by “the ideas of the candidate are close to mine” and 1 is 
represented by the following answers: “more competent”, “supports people like me”, “my friend 
and family supported this candidate”, “I like this candidate”, “I identify with the candidates’ 
party”, “another reason”, “I will not vote” 
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GAL-TAN: in a ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 10. O means liberal and 10 means 
conservatism. It was transformed into a dichotomous variable that measured center rights wing 
vote. 2 is represented by those that have chosen a position from 0 to 4 and the rest are placed at 
1. 
Left-Right: is an ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 10. 0 means full statism and 10 full liberalism 
in economy. It was transformed into a dichotomous variable that measured center right wing 
vote. 2 is represented by those that expressed a position from (6 to 10) and the rest are 1. 
Private health care:  Respondents level of agreement with the following statement “The free 
economic competition makes the health system work better”. It is an ordinal variables 
transformed into a dichotomous variable in which 2 means agreement with the issue.            
Reduce public sector: Respondents level of agreement with the following statement “The number 
of employees from the public sector should be reduced” It is an ordinal variables transformed 
into a dichotomous variable in which 2 means agreement with the issue.                        
Market economy   Respondents level of agreement with the following statement “The state 
should intervene as least as possible in the economy” It is an ordinal variables transformed into a 
dichotomous variable in which 2 means agreement with the issue.            
Gay rights: Respondents level of agreement with the following statement “Homosexual couples 
should enjoy the same rights as heterosexual couples” It is an ordinal variables transformed into 
a dichotomous variable in which 2 means agreement with the issue.             
Marijuana use: Respondents level of agreement with the following statement “The usage of 
cannabis as a recreational drug should be legal” It is an ordinal variables transformed into a 
dichotomous variable in which 2 means agreement with the issue.                                  
Pro-choice: Respondents level of agreement with the following statement “Women should have 
the right to decide in matters connected to abortion”  It is an ordinal variables transformed into a 
dichotomous variable in which 2 means agreement with the issue.                
Religion in school: Respondents level of agreement with the following statement “Religion 
should be a compulsory course in public schools” It is an ordinal variables transformed into a 
dichotomous variable in which 2 means agreement with the issue.            
Pro-church: Respondents level of agreement with the following statement “The state should 
offer a privileged status to the Orthodox Church” It is an ordinal variables transformed into a 
dichotomous variable in which 2 means agreement with the issue.    
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